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WHO DECIDES CLASS ARBITRABILITY?: THE VANISHING 
CLASS ACTION MECHANISM’S LAST STAND 
Alexander Corson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The class action and arbitration mechanisms are locked in an 
antagonistic relationship.  As the prevalence of one expands, the other 
shrinks.  Over the past few decades, the use and enforcement of arbitration 
agreements has dramatically increased while class actions have all but 
vanished in certain contexts.1  A series of Supreme Court decisions since 
the 1990s have vigorously protected a “national policy favoring 
arbitration”2 while simultaneously dismantling the class action.  Since 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,3 parties to a contract have largely been able 
to immunize themselves from class proceedings by including class action 
waivers in their standard arbitration agreements.  Class action proponents 
have been unable to circumvent this limitation. 
The Supreme Court has rejected arguments that class action waivers 
contained within arbitration agreements are unconscionable4 or in violation 
of another federal law.5  Additionally, arbitration agreements need not 
explicitly waive class proceedings so long as they specify that arbitration 
shall proceed on an individual basis.6  As a result, arbitration agreements 
foreclose class actions except where they contain no class action waiver 
and no terms specifying individualized proceedings.  But what about 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law Class of 2020.  Thank you to 
Associate Dean Kristen E. Boon for her guidance and to Professor Charles A. Sullivan for 
very helpful comments.  Thanks also to Jessica Guarracino, Hannah Levine, Stephanie 
Torres, Tatiana Laing, and all the editors of the SETON HALL LAW REVIEW for their 
feedback. 
 1  For a discussion of the prevalence of such agreements in employment contracts, see 
Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration, ECON. POLICY INST. 
(Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-use-of-mandatory-arbitration-
access-to-the-courts-is-now-barred-for-more-than-60-million-american-workers/ (finding 
that the use of arbitration agreements in employment contracts has grown from two percent 
in 1991 to over 55 percent in 2017). 
 2  Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006). 
 3  563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 4  See id. at 341. 
 5  See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
 6  See id. 
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arbitration agreements that do not expressly waive class proceedings and 
are silent as to how they should proceed? 
The Supreme Court has made plain that “class arbitration” is 
undesirable.7  The majority opinions in both Concepcion and Stolt-Nielsen 
v. AnimalFeeds detail the dangers of permitting class arbitration, opining 
that arbitration is “poorly suited” to class proceedings.8  This has created a 
legal landscape in which courts are loath to interpret general arbitration 
agreements as allowing for class arbitration.  As such, it is only where the 
power of interpretation is vested in an entity other than the courts that class 
arbitration can realistically occur.  This gives special significance to a 
current circuit split over the delegation of these interpretive powers to 
arbitrators.  The Supreme Court has held that courts shall decide the scope 
of arbitration absent “clear and unmistakable” evidence that the parties 
have agreed to let an arbitrator make this determination.9  In the context of 
bilateral arbitration, a widely accepted method of satisfying this standard is 
through the incorporation of a set of arbitration rules granting arbitrators 
the power to rule on their own jurisdiction, such as the American 
Arbitration Association (AAA) rules.10  Though some courts have refused 
to adopt this reasoning11 and certain circuits have limited their holdings,12 
“[v]irtually every circuit to have considered the issue has determined that 
incorporation of the [AAA] arbitration rules constitutes clear and 
unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability.”13 
 
When it comes to class arbitration, however, there is no such 
 
 7  See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348 (“class arbitration sacrifices the principal advantage 
of arbitration”); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686 (2010). 
 8  See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 350; Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 686. 
 9  See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995); AT&T 
Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986). 
 10  See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Myriad Grp. A.G., 724 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013); 
Petrofac, Inc. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 687 F.3d 671, 675 (5th Cir. 
2012); Fallo v. High-Tech Inst., 559 F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir. 2009); Qualcomm, Inc. v. 
Nokia Corp., 466 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Terminix Int’l Co. v. Palmer Ranch LP, 
432 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2005); Contec Corp. v. Remote Sol. Co., 398 F.3d 205, 208 
(2d Cir. 2005). 
 11  See Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., No. 5:13-CV-05682-LH, 2014 WL 2903752, at *11 
(N.D. Cal. June 25, 2014); Meadows v. Dickey’s Barbecue Rests., Inc., 144 F. Supp. 3d 
1069, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Toll Bros., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 3d 417, 428 
(E.D. Pa. 2016); Richardson v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., No. 18-532, 2018 WL 4639225, at *4 
(D.N.J. 2018). 
 12  See Oracle, 724 F.3d at 1075 (“We hold that as long as an arbitration agreement is 
between sophisticated parties to commercial contracts, those parties shall be expected to 
understand that incorporation of the UNCITRAL rules delegates questions of arbitrability to 
the arbitrator.”). 
 13  Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 809 F.3d 746, 763 (3d Cir. 
2016) (quoting Oracle, 724 F.3d at 1074). 
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consensus.  Some courts draw a hard line between class and bilateral 
arbitration when determining whether arbitrability may be delegated.14  
Relying on language in Concepcion and Nielsen, the Third Circuit held in 
2016 that referencing the AAA rules does not constitute “clear and 
unmistakable” evidence that the parties agreed to delegate class 
arbitrability to an arbitrator.15  In 2018, the Second Circuit held the 
opposite.16  Following the Second Circuit approach, a narrow avenue to 
class actions survives.  Class actions involving an arbitration agreement 
may proceed where that agreement:  
(1) contains no class action waiver; (2) does not specify that it shall 
proceed on an individual basis; (3) delegates arbitrability to an arbitrator; 
and (4) the arbitrator determines, in his discretion, that proceeding as a 
class would be appropriate.  Under the Third Circuit approach, this narrow 
road evaporates: only those class actions involving no arbitration 
agreement will survive.  Since arbitration agreements have become 
overwhelmingly common in a majority of standard consumer and 
employment contracts,17 the path to class actions in these cases has become 
so narrow that it may as well not exist at all. 
This Comment will focus on the vanishing class action mechanism in 
the context of consumer and employment contracts.  Part II will examine 
foundational Supreme Court jurisprudence that endorsed the use of class 
action waivers in arbitration agreements.  Part III will explore obstacles to 
judicial interpretation of arbitration agreements that would allow for class 
arbitration.  Part IV will analyze legal and practical considerations relating 
to the circuit split over the delegation of class arbitrability.  Part V will 
offer that the elimination of the class mechanism could have negative 
implications both for would-be plaintiffs and defendants before briefly 
concluding in Part VI.  This Comment assumes that the pervasiveness of 
arbitration agreements in standard consumer and employment contracts 
will continue to grow and does not discuss the availability of class actions 
to claimants in other circumstances. 
II.  CLASS ACTION WAIVERS 
A.  Concepcion: The FAA Preempts State Law Barring Class Action 
Waivers 
Concepcion heralded the beginning of the end for consumer and 
employment class actions. The case involved a contract between Vincent 
 
 14  See id. 
 15  See id. at 766. 
 16  See Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC v. Sappington, 884 F.3d 392, 398 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 17  Colvin, supra note 1. 
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and Liza Concepcion and AT&T for telephone services, which were 
advertised to include free phones, but actually included a $30.22 sales tax 
fee.18  The Concepcions filed a complaint in the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of California that was consolidated with a 
putative class action alleging fraud and false advertising, among other 
things.19  AT&T moved to compel individual arbitration in accordance with 
the terms and conditions of its contract with the Concepcions.20  The 
district court denied AT&T’s motion, finding the arbitration agreement 
unconscionable under California law, following Discover Bank v. Superior 
Court,21 because it waived class-wide proceedings.22  The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed, holding such a rule was not preempted by the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA).23  The Supreme Court reversed in a 5-4 decision, finding the 
Discover Bank rule inconsistent with the goals of the FAA.24  Since 
Congress’s purpose in enacting the FAA was to ensure arbitration 
agreements are enforced by their terms, a state law rule requiring class-
wide proceedings is in direct conflict because it interferes with the 
fundamental attributes of arbitration.25  The result of Concepcion is that 
when arbitration and state law clash, arbitration is the victor.  But it was not 
immediately clear whether this would extend to conflicts between the FAA 
and another federal interest. 
B. Italian Colors: Federal Law Must Demonstrate a “Contrary 
Congressional Command” 
The answer came in American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant,26 
in which merchants filed a class action antitrust suit against American 
Express.  The agreement between American Express and the plaintiffs 
provided that there would be “no right or authority for any Claims to be 
arbitrated on a class action basis.”27  Plaintiffs argued that the court should 
not compel arbitration because the costs associated with proving an 
antitrust violation would far exceed any individual plaintiff’s recovery, 
even after treble damages.28  The district court ordered arbitration and the 
Second Circuit reversed, holding that the prohibitive costs rendered the 
 
 18  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 337 (2011). 
 19  Id. 
 20  Id. 
 21  113 P.3d 1100, 1108–09 (Cal. 2005). 
 22  Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 338. 
 23  Id. 
 24  Id. at 348. 
 25  Id. at 344. 
 26  American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013). 
 27  Id. at 231. 
 28  Id. 
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waiver unenforceable,29 and declining to follow Concepcion because it 
dealt with state-law preemption, unlike the federal antitrust laws at issue.30  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the FAA allowed 
courts “to invalidate arbitration agreements on the ground that they do not 
permit class arbitration of a federal-law claim.”31 
The Supreme Court overturned the Second Circuit, finding no 
evidence that “the FAA’s mandate ha[d] been ‘overridden by a contrary 
congressional command.’”32  The Court noted that the Sherman Act and the 
Clayton Act make no mention of class actions and declined to extend an 
“effective vindication” exception to the FAA which would invalidate 
arbitration agreements that adversely impact a party’s right to pursue 
statutory remedies.33  The Court cited Concepcion, restating its specific 
rejection of an argument that class arbitration is necessary to vindicate all 
of the rights at issue.34 
Italian Colors extended Concepcion beyond state-law preemption, 
demanding a “contrary congressional command” in another federal law to 
overcome the FAA’s presumption in favor of arbitration.  Such a challenge 
was brought in 2018, and the Court was given an opportunity to add clarity 
to this standard. 
C.   Epic Systems: “Concerted Activities” Does Not Include Class 
Actions 
In Epic Systems v. Lewis,35 the Court faced the question: “[s]hould 
employees and employers be allowed to agree that any disputes between 
them will be resolved through one-on-one arbitration?”36  Three cases were 
consolidated in which employees brought putative class actions claiming 
they and others had been misclassified under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA).37  The employers moved to compel arbitration in accordance with 
employment agreements that required bilateral arbitration.38  The Plaintiffs 
 
 29  Id. at 232. 
 30  Id. 
 31  Id. 
 32  Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 233. 
 33  Id. at 234–36. 
 34  Id. at 238. 
 35  Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
 36  Id. at 1619. 
 37  Id. at 1619–20. 
 38  “This ‘concerted action waiver’ required employees to (1) pursue legal claims 
against Ernst & Young exclusively through arbitration and (2) arbitrate only as individuals 
and in ‘separate proceedings.’”  Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 
2016), rev’d sub nom. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018), and vacated, 894 
F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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argued that the saving clause of the FAA39 removed the obligation of 
arbitration because the agreements violated the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA), which safeguards the rights of employees to “engage in . . . 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual 
aid or protection[.]”40  The Ninth Circuit held that agreeing to forgo all 
collective actions violated the NLRA.41  The Supreme Court reversed on 
the grounds that the saving clause recognized “only defenses that apply to 
‘any’ contract.”42  Following its reasoning in Concepcion,43 the Court 
rejected the argument that a contract is unenforceable “because it requires 
bilateral arbitration”44 since this position “impermissibly disfavors 
arbitration.”45  The Court explained that where two federal statutes 
apparently conflict, it must “give effect to both.”46  The plaintiffs failed to 
carry their burden of showing “a clearly expressed congressional 
intention”47 to displace the FAA with the NLRA.48  Epic Systems solidified 
the extension of Concepcion in Italian Colors, and indicates that even laws 
that purport to protect concerted action will not prevail against the FAA.49 
III.  CLASS ARBITRABILITY 
Concepcion makes clear that there is no right to class proceedings 
where they have been expressly waived in an arbitration agreement.50  But 
the opinion and its predecessor, Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds,51 also 
 
 39  The section provides:  
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy 
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform 
the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to 
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, 
or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). 
 40  29 U.S.C. § 157 (2018); Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1620. 
 41  Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1620. 
 42  Id. at 1622. 
 43  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 44  Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1623. 
 45  Id. 
 46  See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974). 
 47  Id. 
 48  Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1624. 
 49  As Professor Almendares concludes, Italian Colors and Epic Systems indicate that it 
would take an act of Congress to counteract the effect of Concepcion, and “such action 
would have to be rather explicit.”  Nicholas Almendares, Aggregation and Governance in 
Litigation, (Seton Hall Public Law, Working Paper, Aug. 8, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract 
=3228873. 
 50  See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 51  559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
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express hostility to class arbitration on the whole.52  Given this, under what 
circumstances, if any, can class arbitration occur?  An agreement expressly 
providing for class arbitration would presumably be valid.  But would the 
Supreme Court permit class arbitration where an agreement is silent as to 
whether it will proceed individually or as a class?  The cases examined 
below indicate that the Supreme Court would likely answer that question in 
the negative. 
A.   Nielsen: Implicit Agreements to Class Arbitration 
Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds is perhaps less important for its holding 
than it is for its reasoning.  The Court addressed a dispute between Stolt-
Nielsen, a shipping company,53 and AnimalFeeds, a customer that relied on 
Stolt-Nielsen to deliver its products around the world.54  When Stolt-
Nielsen came under investigation for engaging in an illegal price-fixing 
conspiracy, AnimalFeeds and other vendors initiated lawsuits.55  The 
standard contract used by Stolt-Nielsen contained an arbitration agreement 
that made no mention of class arbitration.56  The parties stipulated to 
silence on the availability of class arbitration and selected a panel of 
arbitrators to resolve the question.57  After hearing arguments and evidence 
regarding arbitration customs and usage in maritime trade, the panel 
determined that class arbitration was available.58  Stolt-Nielsen sought 
judicial review of the panel’s determination.59  The District Court for the 
Southern District of New York overturned the decision and was 
subsequently reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.60 
 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and found that the arbitration 
panel erred in allowing class arbitration.61  The Court held that, where 
parties stipulate that a contract is silent as to class arbitrability, they cannot 
be compelled to submit to class arbitration.62  Resting its analysis on the 
“foundational FAA principle that arbitration is a matter of consent,” the 
Court held that a party may not be bound to class arbitration unless there is 
 
 52  See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 350; Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 
U.S. 662, 686 (2010). 
 53  Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 666. 
 54  Id. 
 55  Id. at 667. 
 56  Id. 
 57  Id. at 668. 
 58  Id. at 669. 
 59  Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 669. 
 60  Id. at 669–70. 
 61  Id. at 674. 
 62  Id. at 684. 
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a “contractual basis” for concluding that they had “agreed to do so.”63  The 
Court rejected the notion that an implicit agreement to class arbitration 
could ever exist,64 explaining that class arbitration “changes the nature of 
arbitration” such that it cannot be agreed to simply by submitting to 
arbitration.65  Dissenting, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that if the parties 
had chosen a judicial forum to resolve “any dispute” involving a contract, 
class proceedings would undeniably have been available.66 
The Court’s holding, while narrow in the sense that it addressed only 
situations in which a contract is silent as to class arbitration, has wide 
implications on the interpretation of arbitration agreements at large.  A few 
years later, the Court answered whether an arbitral decision could bind 
parties to class arbitration where they did not stipulate to silence. 
B. Sutter: Limited Review of Arbitral Decisions 
Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter67 similarly involved an appeal of an 
arbitrator’s decision to proceed as a class.  The parties, unlike in Nielsen, 
did not stipulate to silence on the availability of class arbitration and 
submitted the question to an arbitrator.68  When the arbitrator determined 
that class arbitration was available, Oxford appealed, arguing that the 
arbitrator could not have found sufficient evidence of an agreement to class 
arbitration.69  The Court first clarified Nielsen, explaining that it 
“overturned the arbitral decision [in Nielsen] because it lacked any 
contractual basis for ordering class procedures, not because it lacked . . . a 
‘sufficient’ one.”70  The Court concluded that, due to the “limited judicial 
review” allowed under the FAA, it could not overturn the arbitrator’s 
decision where the parties agreed to let an arbitrator decide.71  The Court 
emphasized its limited power of review while expressing skepticism that 
the parties actually agreed to class arbitration.72  A concurring opinion by 
Justice Alito, the author of Nielsen, suggested that the Court could not have 
 
 63  Id. 
 64  Importantly, Justice Alito’s opinion recognized that parties could implicitly delegate 
the question to an arbitrator, but that an arbitrator (and presumably courts) could not answer 
that question by finding an agreement to class arbitration implicit in a general agreement to 
arbitrate.  Id. at 685–86. 
 65  Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 685. 
 66  Id. at 698. 
 67  569 U.S. 564 (2013). 
 68  See id. at 566. 
 69  Id. 567–68. 
 70  Id. at 571. 
 71  Id. at 573. 
 72  Id. at 568–69. 
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upheld the arbitrator’s determination on the merits.73  In 2019, however, the 
Supreme Court clarified what the FAA requires for a court to decide in 
favor of class arbitration. 
C.  Varela: Implicit Agreements to Class Arbitration 
In Lamps Plus v. Varela,74 the Court granted certiorari to answer the 
question: “Does the Federal Arbitration Act foreclose a state-law 
interpretation of an arbitration agreement that would authorize class 
arbitration based solely on general language commonly used in arbitration 
agreements?”75  The Ninth Circuit held that a failure to reference class 
arbitration is not the “silence” that Nielsen found insufficient to show 
agreement.76  The court found the language ambiguous: 
At its outset, the Agreement contains a paragraph outlining 
Varela’s understanding of the terms in three sweeping phrases. 
First, it states Varela’s assent to waiver of “any right I may have 
to file a lawsuit or other civil action or proceeding relating to my 
employment with the Company.” Second, it includes an 
additional waiver by Varela of “any right I may have to resolve 
employment disputes through trial by judge or jury.” Third, 
“arbitration shall be in lieu of any and all lawsuits or other civil 
legal proceedings relating to my employment.”77 
The Ninth Circuit determined that two reasonable constructions were 
possible, noting the more reasonable interpretation would authorize class 
arbitration.78  The Court found that no “interpretive acrobatics” were 
necessary to include class proceedings within the meaning of “a lawsuit or 
other civil legal proceeding.”79  The Court explained: “[c]lass actions are 
certainly one of the means to resolve employment disputes in court. That 
arbitration will be ‘in lieu of’ a set of actions that includes class actions can 
be reasonably read to allow for class arbitration.”80  Accordingly, the Ninth 
Circuit found that, construing against the drafter in accordance with 
 
 73  Sutter, 569 U.S. at 574 (“If we were reviewing the arbitrator’s interpretation of the 
contract de novo, we would have little trouble concluding that he improperly inferred ‘[a]n 
implicit agreement to authorize class-action arbitration . . . from the fact of the parties’ 
agreement to arbitrate.’” (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 
662, 685 (2010)). 
 74  139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019). 
 75  Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-988 (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
 76  Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 701 Fed. App’x. 670, 672 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 
138 S. Ct. 1697 (2018). 
 77  Id. 
 78  Id. at 673. 
 79  Id. at 672.  
 80  Id. 
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California law, the language met the “contractual basis” standard under 
Nielsen.81 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and readily extended Nielsen.  
After deferring to the Ninth Circuit’s finding that the agreement was 
ambiguous as to class arbitration under California contract law, the Court 
held that an ambiguous agreement cannot provide the “necessary 
contractual basis” required for compelling class arbitration.82  Relying on 
the reasoning of Nielsen, the Court found no meaningful difference 
between an ambiguous agreement and a silent agreement.83  The Court 
explained that “arbitration is strictly a matter of consent”—and that it had 
“emphasized that foundational FAA principle many times.”84  The “crucial 
differences” between bilateral and class arbitration set forth in Nielsen 
provide “reason to doubt the parties’ mutual consent to resolve disputes 
through classwide arbitration.”85  The Court’s extension of Nielsen to 
ambiguous agreements eradicates any possibility that courts might find an 
implicit agreement to class arbitration. 
IV.  DELEGATING CLASS ARBITRABILITY 
Taking the Nielsen and Concepcion strands of jurisprudence together, 
a series of extremely specific circumstances must arise for a consumer or 
employment class action to take place.  The Supreme Court has made clear 
that courts may not interpret general arbitration agreements as implicitly 
authorizing class arbitration.  And since drafters generally want to avoid 
class proceedings, it is unlikely that an express provision would ever be 
found in such agreements.  It follows that only in cases where an arbitrator 
has authority over this interpretive question could class arbitration come to 
pass.86  Thus, when arbitrators are permitted to make this determination is 
of critical importance.  As discussed in Part I, it is nearly settled law that 
incorporation of a set of arbitral rules granting arbitrators the power to rule 
on their own jurisdiction constitutes “clear and unmistakable” evidence that 
the parties agreed to arbitrate the question of bilateral arbitrability.  But 
courts disagree as to the efficacy of such incorporations in the case of class 
arbitrability, even where class arbitration is contemplated by the 
incorporated rules. 
 
 81  Id. at 673. 
 82  Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1415 (2019). 
 83  See id. at 1416 (“Like silence, ambiguity does not provide a sufficient basis to 
conclude that parties to an arbitration agreement agreed to ‘sacrifice[] the principal 
advantage of arbitration.’”). 
 84  Id. at 1415 (internal citations omitted). 
 85  Id. at 1416 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 
685–86 (2010)). 
 86  Recalling the limited judicial review dispositive in Sutter. 
CORSON(DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2020  5:34 PM 
2020] COMMENT 1105 
A.  Reed: The Sixth Circuit Extends Nielsen Pre-Varela 
In Reed Elsevier v. Crockett, Craig Crockett sued LexisNexis, a 
division of Reed Elsevier, in a putative class action alleging fraud, 
negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and a number of other 
theories in connection with a subscription agreement between his former 
law firm and the legal-research service provider.87  LexisNexis filed a 
lawsuit in an Ohio district court seeking a declaration that the arbitration 
clause in the subscription agreement did not authorize class arbitration.88  
The court ruled in favor of LexisNexis and, on appeal, Crockett argued that 
an arbitrator, rather than the court, should have decided the issue of class 
arbitrability.89  Citing the reasoning of Nielsen and Concepcion, the court 
held that the agreement did not demonstrate “clear and unmistakable” 
evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate class arbitrability.90  The 
arbitration agreement in question provided: 
Except as provided below, any controversy, claim or 
counterclaim (whether characterized as permissive or 
compulsory) arising out of or in connection with this Order 
(including any amendment or addenda thereto), whether based 
on contract, tort, statute, or other legal theory (including but not 
limited to any claim of fraud or misrepresentation) will be 
resolved by binding arbitration under this section and the then-
current Commercial Rules and supervision of the American 
Arbitration Association (“AAA”).91 
While the court did not directly address an argument that incorporation of 
the AAA rules delegated the decision to an arbitrator, it held that the 
ambiguous agreement could not wrest the decision from the court, noting 
that it failed to make any mention of class arbitration.92  The court 
proceeded to conduct its own analysis of the availability of class arbitration 
under Nielsen and, relying on the same reasoning ultimately applied in 
Varela which foreclosed an implicit agreement, held that class arbitration 
was not available.93 
B.  Chesapeake: The Third Circuit Decides the Incorporation 
Question 
In Chesapeake Appalachia v. Scout Petroleum, the Third Circuit 
 
 87  Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594, 596 (6th Cir. 2013).  
 88  Id. 
 89  Id. at 596–97. 
 90  Id. at 599.  
 91  Id. 
 92  Id. 
 93  Reed, 734 F.3d at 600. 
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addressed for the first time whether incorporation of the AAA rules 
delegates the question of class arbitrability to the arbitrator.  In a dispute 
over various oil and gas leases, the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania granted Chesapeake an order vacating an 
arbitral decision on the grounds that the leases did not “clearly and 
unmistakably” delegate the availability of class arbitration to the 
arbitrators.94  The relevant arbitration agreement provided: 
In the event of a disagreement between Lessor and Lessee 
concerning this Lease, performance thereunder, or damages 
caused by Lessee’s operations, the resolution of all such disputes 
shall be determined by arbitration in accordance with the rules of 
the American Arbitration Association. All fees and costs 
associated with the arbitration shall be borne equally by Lessor 
and Lessee.95 
The Third Circuit first reviewed the AAA rules, noting they are “couched 
in terms of individual or ‘bilateral’ arbitration proceedings” and then 
examined the portions that would grant an arbitrator authority to determine 
her own jurisdiction.96  The court then examined precedent and explained 
that no binding authority required it to follow Reed or its prior decision, 
Opalinski, since the question was not presented in either case.97 
Nevertheless, after restating the “contractual basis” holding of 
Nielsen,98 the court held that referencing the AAA rules did not delegate 
class arbitrability to an arbitrator.99  The court expressed concerns over the 
“daisy-chain of cross-references” from the leases to the AAA Commercial 
Rules and finally to the AAA Supplementary Rules.100  Concluding that the 
daisy-chain was susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the 
court found that “express contractual language unambiguously delegating 
the question of [class] arbitrability to the arbitrator[]” was lacking.101  The 
court went on to note that, while “[v]irtually every circuit to have 
considered the issue has determined that incorporation of the [AAA] 
arbitration rules constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties 
agreed to arbitrate arbitrability,”102 “this ‘bilateral arbitration case law’ is 
 
 94  Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 809 F.3d 746, 748 (3d Cir. 
2016). 
 95  Id. at 749. 
 96  Id.  These rules are discussed in more depth infra Part IV.D.1. 
 97  Chesapeake, 809 F.3d at 757. 
 98  Id. at 759. 
 99  Id. at 766. 
 100  Id. at 761. 
 101  Id. at 763 (quoting Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 761 F.3d 326, 335 (3rd Cir. 
2014)). 
 102  Chesapeake, 809 F.3d at 763 (quoting Oracle Am., Inc. v. Myriad Grp. A.G., 724 
F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013)). 
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entitled to relatively little weight in the class arbitrability context.”103  
Relying heavily on Nielsen and Concepcion, the court enumerated concerns 
over the “serious consequences” of permitting class arbitration.104  These 
consequences, it summarized, included: 
[(1) a]n arbitrator . . . no longer resolves a single dispute between 
the parties to a single agreement, but instead resolves many 
disputes between hundreds or perhaps even thousands of 
parties . . . [; (2)] the presumption of privacy and confidentiality 
that applies in many bilateral arbitrations [does] not apply in 
class arbitrations[,] thus potentially frustrating the parties’ 
assumptions when they agreed to arbitrate[; (3) t]he arbitrator’s 
award no longer purports to bind just the parties to a single 
arbitration agreement, but adjudicates the rights of absent parties 
as well[; and (4)] the commercial stakes of class-action 
arbitration are comparable to those of class-action litigation, 
even though the scope of judicial review is much more 
limited.105 
After concluding that the parties did not delegate the question to an 
arbitrator, the court adopted the district court’s analysis and held that class 
arbitration was unavailable.106 
C.  Sappington: The Second Circuit Breaks from Chesapeake 
Since Chesapeake, the Eighth Circuit has subsequently joined the 
Third Circuit on the delegation issue.107  But in 2018, the Second Circuit 
broke from its sister circuits in Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC v. 
Sappington.108  Sappington concerned unpaid overtime wages under the 
FLSA.109  Former employees of Wells Fargo filed a putative class action in 
the Southern District of New York despite a broad arbitration agreement in 
their employment contracts.110  Wells Fargo petitioned the court to compel 
 
 103  Chesapeake, 809 F.3d at 764. 
 104  Id. 
 105  Id. (quoting Opalinski, 761 F.3d at 333). 
 106  Chesapeake, 809 F.3d at 766. 
 107  See, e.g., Catamaran Corp. v. Towncrest Pharm., 864 F.3d 966, 973 (8th Cir. 2017) 
(incorporating the language of Chesapeake). 
 108  884 F.3d 392 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 109  Id. at 393–94. 
 110  Id. at 394.  Two agreements were analyzed in Sappington.  The agreement relevant 
to our discussion provided:  
You are agreeing to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise 
between you and Wells Fargo Advisors . . . . [Y]ou agree that any 
controversy or dispute . . . shall be submitted for arbitration before the 
[Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”)]. If the FINRA does not 
accept the controversy . . . [it] shall be submitted for arbitration before the 
American Arbitration Association [(“AAA”)] pursuant to its Securities 
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bilateral arbitration and the court denied their petition, holding that an 
arbitrator, not the court, must decide the availability of class arbitration.111  
The court noted that the Securities Arbitration Rules were replaced by the 
Commercial Arbitration Rules long before the present controversy arose, 
and that Rule 7 allows an arbitrator to rule on her own jurisdiction.112  
Since the Supplementary Rules include language referencing class 
proceedings, the court concluded that the combination of these rules clearly 
grants the question of class arbitrability to the arbitrator.113 
Undeterred by “bilateral terminology” (i.e. “you and Wells Fargo”) 
similar to language the Third Circuit found significant in Chesapeake, the 
Second Circuit explained that references to the employee and employer are 
to be expected in an employment contract.114  The court declined to join its 
sister circuits, and lightly chastised them for ignoring state law in arriving 
at their conclusion.115  The court explained that while concerns about the 
increased stakes of class arbitration are valid, they do not bear on the 
appropriate question.116  The two-step analysis is: “(1) determining whether 
the question is one of arbitrability . . . and, if so (2) determining, on a case-
by-case basis, whether there is clear and unmistakable evidence of the 
parties’ intent to let an arbitrator resolve that question.”117  The court found 
that concerns over the impact of class arbitration apply only to the first step 
of this analysis and that they should not bleed into the second step.118  
Under state law, nothing more than the language of the contract119 was 
required to grant the question to an arbitrator.120 
Since Sappington, the Eleventh Circuit has joined the Second Circuit, 
evaluating an arbitration agreement stating: “Any dispute arising between 
[the parties] will be resolved by submission to arbitration in Broward 
County, State of Florida in accordance with the rules of the American 
Arbitration Association then in effect.”121  The court agreed that this 
language sufficiently incorporated the AAA Commercial Rules and 
 
Arbitration Rules, effective May 1, 1993. 
Id. 
 111  Id.  
 112  Id. at 397. 
 113  Id. 
 114  Sappington, 884 F.3d at 397. 
 115  Id. at 398.  
 116  Id. 
 117  Id. 
 118  Id. at 398–99. 
 119  See id. at 394. 
 120  Sappington, 884 F.3d at 399. 
 121  Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Maizes, 899 F.3d 1230, 1232 (11th Cir. 2018) (emphasis in 
original). 
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Supplementary Rules and thereby met the clear and unmistakable standard 
required to delegate the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator.122  The 
court echoed the reasoning of the Second Circuit, explaining that it read 
Nielsen to bear only on the question of “whether an agreement allows class 
arbitration at all, separate from the issue of who decides the question to 
begin with.”123  Soon after, the Tenth Circuit joined the Eleventh and 
Second Circuits, similarly finding: “[t]he fundamental differences between 
bilateral and classwide arbitration are irrelevant to us at this second stage of 
the analysis.”124 
D.  Resolving the Circuit Split 
The legal issue in the circuit split over the delegation of class 
arbitrability is essentially whether the reasoning of Nielsen bears on the 
“who decides” question.  Did the Third Circuit allow the “crucial 
differences” between bilateral and class arbitration emphasized in Nielsen 
to improperly impact its reasoning?  These differences are arguably 
irrelevant, and the Nielsen Court did not face the “who decides” question, 
but rather whether the parties had actually consented to class arbitration.  
But the Third Circuit extended Nielsen even beyond Varela, decided three 
years later, finding that the dangers of class arbitration are so formidable 
that arbitrators cannot be trusted with the question of whether the parties 
had indeed consented to such class proceedings.125 
Further, the Chesapeake decision has a paradoxical effect: standard 
arbitration agreements with no mention of class proceedings whatsoever 
effectively become class action waivers.126  This is especially unjust since a 
hypothetical plaintiff who actually reads the entirety of the AAA rules 
would likely assume that they permit class arbitration—because they do.127  
The same legal principle that justifies mandating bilateral arbitration in 
contracts of adhesion works an injustice upon the prudent party 
scrupulously upholding their duty to read.  Affirming Sappington would, at 
the very least, require drafters to disclaim the unavailability of class actions 
 
 122  Id. at 1233–34. 
 123  Id. at 1234. 
 124  Dish Network L.L.C. v. Ray, 900 F.3d 1240, 1247 (10th Cir. 2018). 
 125  See generally Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 809 F.3d 746 
(3d Cir. 2016). 
 126  Justice Ginsburg alluded to a similar concern at oral argument in Varela.  See Oral 
Argument at 18:16, Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019) (No. 17-988), 
https://apps.oyez.org/player/#/roberts10/oral_argument_audio/24633. 
 127  In fact, there is an entire set of supplementary rules dedicated to the procedure.  See 
infra note 132.  Any logical person reviewing the AAA rules would never suspect that an 
arbitrator could not decide to implement a procedure that had a set of rules created 
specifically for that purpose. 
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in order to absolutely preclude them.  The threat of an arbitrator having 
leeway to allow class arbitration would presumably motivate parties with 
superior bargaining power to be upfront about such limitations instead of 
relying on the ambiguity of silence.  But history teaches that the just result 
and the legal result are not always one and the same. 
1.  Legal Analysis 
The crux of the debate between Chesapeake and Sappington concerns 
two competing readings of the Nielsen opinion.  The courts agree that the 
analysis involves a two-part test, but disagree about whether the skepticism 
in Nielsen toward class arbitration is relevant to both parts of the test, or 
only the first.  The Nielsen and Varela decisions undoubtedly contributed 
to the discussion of whether arbitrators should permit class arbitration, but 
did it also bear on when they should decide the question? 
Logically, it seems that Sappington more closely adheres to the 
weight of authority.  As mentioned, an overwhelming majority of circuit 
courts have held that incorporation of the AAA rules delegates matters of 
bilateral arbitrability to the arbitrator.  Chesapeake refused to extend this 
precedent to class arbitration because of the harsh consequences of class 
proceedings.  Obviously, these consequences tend to bear on what the 
parties reasonably understood the contract to mean—what they “clearly and 
unmistakably” intended—but is it reasonable to withhold certain matters of 
arbitrability where the plain language draws no such lines?  Considering 
the fact that the AAA rules provide for class arbitration, this seems like a 
contrived effort by defendants to take only the good without the bad.  In a 
world where cross-referencing a separate set of rules constitutes “clear and 
unmistakable” evidence of intent, it cannot reasonably be suggested that 
certain rules be followed and others ignored absent any language to that 
effect. 
A careful review of Nielsen does not disrupt this conclusion.  
Throughout the opinion, the Court addressed the ways in which an 
arbitrator may answer the class arbitrability question, but never whether 
they had authority to do so in the first place.  If anything, the Court 
acknowledged that parties may implicitly grant arbitrators this authority: 
“In certain contexts, it is appropriate to presume that parties that enter into 
an arbitration agreement implicitly authorize the arbitrator to adopt such 
procedures as are necessary to give effect to the parties’ agreement.”128  
 
 128  Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684–85 (2010).  But 
see id. at 686 (quoting First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995) 
(noting “that ‘one can understand why courts might hesitate to interpret silence or ambiguity 
on the “who should decide arbitrability” point as giving the arbitrators that power, for doing 
so might too often force unwilling parties to arbitrate’ contrary to their expectations”)). 
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Certainly, there are cases and controversies in which the class action 
mechanism might be considered a “necessary procedure.”  The question 
then remains whether incorporating the AAA rules constitutes an 
“implicit[] authoriz[ation].”129 
In answering this question, a review of the AAA rules is necessary.  
The Commercial Rules indicate: “The arbitrator shall have the power to 
rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to 
the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement or to the 
arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim.”130  Arbitrability is essentially a 
question of scope.  Is the controversy at hand within the scope of what the 
parties agreed to arbitrate?  The answer to this question will vary 
depending on the language in the contract, but who answers is plainly 
indicated in the rule: “the arbitrator shall have th[is] power.”131 
The Supplementary Rules are applicable “to any dispute arising out of 
an agreement that provides for arbitration . . . on behalf of or against a class 
or purported class, and shall supplement any other applicable AAA 
rules.”132  The express language of the rule provides for “arbitration on 
behalf of or against a class.”133  Under any reasonable interpretation, this 
text undeniably brings class arbitration within the contemplation of the 
parties.  In combination with Commercial Rule 7, it is the logical 
conclusion that this constitutes an implicit agreement to grant an arbitrator 
the question of class arbitrability. 
The Chesapeake court cites no precedent for its “daisy-chain” 
concerns134 and there is no reason that, where the source of an extrinsic 
writing is apparent, multiple documents may not be linked in this fashion.  
With no legal principle that would otherwise preclude the AAA rules from 
constituting a valid delegation of the question, the Sappington approach 
should prevail. 
2.  Practical Considerations 
Having considered the legal questions presented by Sappington and 
Chesapeake, it is helpful to also consider what practical effects may result 
 
 129  Id. at 684–85. 
 130  Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures 13, AM. ARB. ASS’N, 
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Commercial%20Rules.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2018) 
(emphasis added). 
 131  Id. 
 132  Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations 3, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.org 
/sites/default/files/Supplementary%20Rules%20for%20Class%20Arbitrations.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2018). 
 133  Id. 
 134  See Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 809 F.3d 746, 761 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (quoting only the appellees’ brief). 
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from their resolution.  The Nielsen court, after answering the inquiry before 
it, presented a list of “fundamental” differences between bilateral and class 
arbitration.135  The court’s discussion of the differences between arbitration 
and litigation underscores a foundational disagreement on which this 
discussion lies: should proceeding as a class be presumptively available in 
arbitration, as it is in court?  The Court answers that it should not, since 
arbitration is contractual in nature.136  Parties are submitting only to what 
they “agree” to in a contract.  But, in practice, arbitration really serves as a 
substitute for the court system.  This issue is highlighted by Justice 
Ginsburg in her Nielsen dissent: 
Suppose the parties had chosen a New York judicial forum for 
resolution of “any dispute” involving a contract for ocean 
carriage of goods.  There is little question that the designated 
court, state or federal, would have authority to conduct claims 
like AnimalFeeds’ on a class basis.  Why should the class-action 
prospect vanish when the “any dispute” clause is contained in an 
arbitration agreement?137 
While the Court’s insistence that arbitration agreements be put on “equal 
footing” with any other contract is logical, it is undermined by its refusal to 
acknowledge that arbitral relief is not given the same equality.138 
 
 135  A portion of the opinion is reproduced below to demonstrate the Court’s fervency on 
this point: 
Consider just some of the fundamental changes brought about by the shift 
from bilateral arbitration to class-action arbitration.  An arbitrator chosen 
according to an agreed-upon procedure no longer resolves a single dispute 
between the parties to a single agreement, but instead resolves many disputes 
between hundreds or perhaps even thousands of parties.  Under the Class 
Rules, “the presumption of privacy and confidentiality” that applies in many 
bilateral arbitrations “shall not apply in class arbitrations,” thus potentially 
frustrating the parties’ assumptions when they agreed to arbitrate.  The 
arbitrator’s award no longer purports to bind just the parties to a single 
arbitration agreement, but adjudicates the rights of absent parties as well.  
And the commercial stakes of class-action arbitration are comparable to those 
of class-action litigation, even though the scope of judicial review is much 
more limited.  We think that the differences between bilateral and class-
action arbitration are too great for arbitrators to presume, consistent with 
their limited powers under the FAA, that the parties’ mere silence on the 
issue of class-action arbitration constitutes consent to resolve their disputes in 
class proceedings. 
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010) (citations 
omitted). 
 136  “The Court ties the requirement of affirmative authorization to the basic precept that 
arbitration is a matter of consent, not coercion.”  Nielsen, 130 S. Ct.  at 1782 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 137  Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1783. 
 138  For further discussion of the not-so-equal footing on which American Arbitration has 
been placed, see Richard Frankel, Corporate Hostility to Arbitration, 50 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 707, 737 (2020). 
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The obvious issue with mandatory arbitration agreements, ignored by 
modern contract law, is that, in many cases, the “agreement” is no more 
than a legal fiction.139  In its endeavor to ensure that voluntary agreements 
are legally binding, modern contract law assumes that contractual 
obligations are voluntarily entered into by informed participants.140  But 
this assumption is made on shaky grounds and, because of it, mechanisms 
like the class action stand to be eliminated in many circumstances.  Recall 
the paradox created by Chesapeake: the silent class action waiver.141  The 
goal of contract law has always been to give force to the intent of the 
parties, often at the expense of all else.  But when the zeal with which we 
protect one party’s understanding of a term results in the judicial 
fabrication of another term, we must abandon this logic.  To think that the 
delegation of an interpretation question could result in a silent waiver of 
rights is mind boggling, and yet this is the result that Chesapeake yields. 
V.  THE CONSEQUENCES OF ELIMINATING THE CLASS ACTION MECHANISM 
There is much literature on the reasons why class actions benefit 
plaintiffs and those with limited bargaining power,142 but it is entirely 
possible that the mechanism stands to protect businesses as well.  Consider 
the history of our country’s “race to the bottom” during the New Deal era.  
In the first decades of the twentieth century, businesses successfully raised 
federalism-based constitutional challenges to each piece of legislation 
seeking to deal with the pervasive, abhorrent workforce conditions.143  The 
federal government contended that state legislation was ineffective at 
achieving minimum wage and maximum hour restrictions because 
employers would simply flee to another state with more favorable laws as 
soon as one passed.144  The result forced employers to compete for the 
lowest possible personnel costs or go out of business.  With no federally 
enacted “floor” on working standards, it created a “race to the bottom.”  
Ultimately, the government prevailed, creating a set of minimum 
standards,145 but businesses still have little incentive to go beyond them.  
 
 139  See, e.g., Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Law Now—Reality Meets Legal Fictions, 41 
BALTIMORE L. REV. 1 (2011); Matt Meinel, Comment, Requiring Mutual Assent in the 21st 
Century: How to Modify Wrap Contracts to Reflect Consumer’s Reality, 18 N.C.J.L. & 
TECH. 180 (2016), http://ncjolt.org/requiring-mutual-assent-21st-century-modify-wrap-
contracts-reflect-consumers-reality/. 
 140  Hart, supra note 139, at 4. 
 141  See supra Part III.A. 
 142  See, e.g., COLLECTIVE ACTIONS: ENHANCING ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND RECONCILING 
MULTILAYER INTERESTS?, (eds. Stefan Wrbka, et al., Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
 143  See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550–51 
(1935). 
 144  See id. at 549. 
 145  See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 301 U.S. 1, 45–47 (1937). 
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The class action mechanism allows the population at large to participate in 
this process of determining where lines should be drawn by allowing 
individuals to band together over small injustices.  Businesses are therefore 
tasked with responding not only to regulation, but to customers and 
employees.  While these victories are often small for each individual 
plaintiff, the real winner is the market at large. 
Take, for example, a class action against McCormick.  The case 
involved a small change to the packaging of McCormick pepper tins.146  
McCormick faced a class action lawsuit for reducing the amount of pepper 
sold in their four ounce tin to three ounces.147  Under today’s commercial 
standards, packaging may use air only to protect the goods (such as in bags 
of chips) or some other practical purpose, not simply to give the impression 
that there is more product within.148  McCormick moved to dismiss, but the 
case survived.149 
At first blush, it is hard to imagine a smaller injustice than being 
fooled into buying one ounce less pepper than you expected.  But while the 
harm to the individual is very small, what about McCormick’s competitors?  
How many billions of ounces of pepper does McCormick sell a year?150  
Assuming individuals continue to use the same amount of pepper, 
regardless of the empty space inside, the repackaging equates to a raw 25% 
profit gain.  But for class actions like this one, competitors would have 
little choice other than to engage in similar practices to keep up.  While 
class actions routinely deal blows to individual market participants, their 
value as a check on unfair competition is vital to the health of the market.  
It requires no leap of logic to see how this principle could apply in 
consumer and employment contracts.  Without the availability of class 
actions, it is possible that a “race to the bottom” situation could arise once 
again. 
 
 146  Jacob Goldstein, Too Much Empty Space in Pepper Tin Prompts Class-Action 
Lawsuit, NPR (Apr. 20, 2016, 5:15 AM), https://www.npr.org/2016/04/20/474935457/plane 
t-money-class-action-lawsuit. 
 147  See In re McCormick & Co., Inc., Pepper Prods. Mktg. & Sale Practices Litig., 215 
F. Supp. 3d 51, 56 (D.D.C. 2016). 
 148  Id. at 60. 
 149  Tamara Burns, McCormick Attempts to Sidestep Pepper False Ad Lawsuit, TOP 
CLASS ACTIONS (July 22, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-
news/340441-mccormick-attempts-sidestep-pepper-false-ad-lawsuit/. 
 150  McCormick has projected $5 billion in sales in 2019.  Lorraine Mirabella, 
McCormick Expects to Hit $5 Billion in Sales by 2019, BALTIMORE SUN (Apr. 4, 2017, 
11:06 AM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-mccormick-investor-day-
20170404-story.html.  Notably, the advertisement of its new plastic packaging makes no 
mention of its quantity reduction. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Class Action and Arbitration mechanisms have been set against 
one another by American jurisprudence.  As the use of arbitration 
agreements expands, the availability of class actions diminishes.  The 
Supreme Court has determined that the congressional intent of the FAA to 
give force to arbitration agreements is paramount, and neither state law nor 
federal statutes have managed to offset this reality.151  Since Concepcion, 
the Court has taken the stance that a party’s interest in proceeding 
collectively cannot override the existing “national policy favoring 
arbitration.”152  Extensions of Concepcion have indicated that it makes no 
difference that statutory rights are impacted,153 and that agreements need 
not make express mention of the class mechanism to waive it.154 
The Court has also expressed great skepticism in Nielsen and 
Concepcion that class proceedings should ever take place in an arbitral 
setting.155  Except where parties grant the question of class arbitrability to 
an entity other than the judiciary, it has become extremely unlikely that 
such proceedings will occur.  This reality has thrust weight upon a circuit 
split concerning when an arbitrator may decide questions of class 
arbitrability.156  The narrow issue, presented by the Chesapeake-Sappington 
circuit split, appears to be no more than a simple matter of contract 
interpretation.  But its effect on the class action mechanism is enormous.  
Following the Chesapeake approach, a paradoxical ‘silent class action 
waiver’ results, whereupon parties may waive their right to a class action 
by signing a contract making no mention of class proceedings.  By contrast, 
the Sappington approach preserves an already narrow avenue to class 
actions. 
Regardless of how the Chesapeake-Sappington circuit split is 
resolved, the class mechanism is in danger of extinction in the consumer 
and employment setting.  This is obviously harmful to would-be plaintiffs, 
as they lose a significant source of power to collectively influence the way 
businesses conduct activities.  But the market itself stands to suffer as well.  
Our nation’s history makes plain the dangers of an entirely unregulated 
 
 151  See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018); Italian Colors Rest. v. 
Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013); AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 563 
U.S. 333, 343 (2011). 
 152  See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006). 
 153  See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2312. 
 154  See generally Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1617–18. 
 155  See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 347–48; Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 
130 S. Ct. 1775–76 (2010). 
 156  See Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 809 F.3d 746, 755–56 
(3d Cir. 2016); Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC v. Sappington, 884 F.3d 392, 398 (2d Cir. 
2018). 
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market.  Class actions are one of several necessary checks on businesses 
that prevent competitors from being forced to decide between copying less 
scrupulous practices or going out of business.  The future of the class 
action mechanism in other contexts remains uncertain.  But unless our 
jurisprudence changes course, it is entirely possible that we will face yet 
another economic downturn once arbitration extinguishes the class action 
mechanism for consumers and employees altogether. 
 
